Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
An essential ingredient of economic globalization is that multinational enterprises are striving to make use oftheir intellectual-property-related assets beyond national borders. However, multinational enterprises are reluctant to engage in countries where an unauthorized use of such assets byoutsiders is not prevented. The protection ofintellectual property rights (IPRs) remains far from being harmonized across countries, even though the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), representing one of the pillars of the WTO framework that emerged from the Uruguay Round, contains a set of minimum standards for IPR protection.
Yet, the question ofhow important IPR protection is in the international competition for foreign direct investment (FDI) is still unsettled. Theoretical reasoning and empirical investigations point to an ambiguous relationship between IPR protection and the distribution of FDI across countries. In the present paper, we hypothesize that there are ambiguities at least partly because the threat of an unauthorized use of intellectual-property-related assets depends on industry characteristics as weIl as host-country conditions. Hence, we analyze the impact ofIPR protection on FDI for different host countries and on a sectorally disaggregated level. Furthermore, in contrast to earlier studies, we apply different measures ofIPR protection and we consider alternative dependent variables, including the technology content of FDI, in order to test the proposition that IPR protection raises not only the quantity of FDI hut also impacts on FDI-related activities that many host countries consider to reflect the quality of FDI.
The paper is structured as folIows: Section 2 shortly reviews previous findings and offers hypotheses on open questions. The data and estimation procedures are described in Section 3. Empirical results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes and offers some conclusions.
Previous Findings and Hypotheses
Earlier studies, including Ferrantino (1993) , Maskus and Eby-Konan (1994) , and Lee and Mansfield (1996) , present mixed results on the relationship between IPR protection and FD!. Ambiguous findings may be due to several reasons: measurement problems related to IPR protection, the use ofhighly aggregated FDI data, and substitution effects between FDI and other forms of making use of intellectual property beyond national borders. The focus of recent studies has been on the third factor, especially on licensing as an alternative internationalization strategy. Yang and Maskus (2001) show that royalties and license fees received by US companies rise with stronger IPR protection in 23 partner countries. Horstmann and Markusen (1987) argue that, once a strong level of IPR protection is achieved, FDI tends to be replaced by licensing. Smith (2001) uses sales of US affiliates as an FDI-related dependent variable and finds that the effects of stronger patent rights on FDI are more pronounced than the effects on US exports, but less pronounced than the effects on licensing by US firms.
1 Nicholson (2003) 395 analyzes the effects of IPR protection by using the number of US firms engaging in FDI or licensing as dependent variables. Measurement problems as weIl as industry characteristics and hostcountry conditions have received less attention in the empiricalliterature, even though both factors are likely to matter for the relationship between IPR protection and FDI. Maskus (1998: 198) argues that the ambiguous findings ofearlier studies could be due to crude measures oflPR protection. This is why we consider alternative measures, including recent survey data on IPR protection, in our empirical estimates.
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In addition, there are various reasons to suspect that the impact of IPR protection on FDI is blurred unless industry characteristics and hostcountry conditions are taken into account. The relevance ofthese factors can be derived from the so-called OLl framework, developed by Dunning (1977 Dunning ( , 1981 , according to which FDI is driven by the interplay between ownership advantages, locational conditions, and internalization motives. As concerns industry characteristics, Maskus (1998 Maskus ( , 2000 posits that IPR protection is more important for FDI in industries with considerable intellectualproperty-related ownership advantages than for FDI in services as weIl as in low-tech and standardized manufacturing.
3 Likewise, host-country conditions can be expected to shape the relationship between IPR protection and FD!. For example, we suspect IPR protection to be a minor puIl factor for FDI in neighboring countries and in host countries with huge domestic markets, since closeness and market size are likely to dominate the investment decision. Furthermore, the sensitivity of FDI to IPR protection is supposed to depend on the host countries' capacity for local imitation. On the one hand, IPR protection can be expected to induce more FDI in host countries with some imitative capacity. On the other hand, the effect of IPR protection on FDI may turn negative if imitative capacity goes hand in example, information on IPR protection is available for 25 years, rather than "for only one year" (Smith 2001: 421) . The cross-time variability of variables, considered to be minor by Smith, would increase considerably if more recent developments in IPR protection and booming FDI were taken into account. Furthermore, in contrast to the argumentation of Smith, there are good reasons to expect substantial cross-industry variability, which can be explored with publicly available sectorally disaggregated data.
hand with particularly strong IPR protection, since licensing becomes more attractive.
This reasoning suggests that «the need is acute for sectoral breakdowns of investment" (Maskus 2000: 15) in order to allow for a better understanding of the role of IPR protection. Yet, FDI is typically considered in aggregated terms in previous regression analyses on the determinants of FDI. Few empirical studies take into account that the impact of IPR protection on FDI is highly likely to be industry-specific:
• Primo Braga and Fink (2000) allow for some industry-specific effects.
However, these authors consider just three industries (chemicals, machinery, and electrical equipment), the sampIe ofhost countries remains fairly small, and the results refer only to 1992 (i.e., the recent boom of FDI is not captured).
• Smarzynska (2004) In the analysis below, we assess additional industry characteristics and define these characteristics on the basis of the operations of foreign subsidiaries, rather than following Nicholson's approach to take industry data for the United States.
5
The aforementioned studies have in common that (i) they do not apply alternative measures of IPR protection and (ii) the analysis is restricted to the number of FDI projects (Nicholson 2003) or the quantity of FDI. The subsequent analysis attempts to overcome these shortcomings. However, the use ofdisaggregated data on FDland FD1-related activities prevents us from evaluating substitution effects between FDI and other internationalization strategies. Similarly disaggregated data on licensing are not available to us. Yet, the existing evidence on substitution effects, notably from Smith (2001) , is referred to in the interpretation of our results.
Data and Approach
The subsequent analysis is based on FDI and FDI-related activities of US direct investors. This is because the BEA (2003) Barro and Lee (2000) , an indicator ofinvestment costs derived from survey results on corruption and regulatory quality presented by Kaufmann et al. (2002) , and the distance between Kansas City and the host-country capitals provided by the US Geological Service. To capture the degree of IPR protection, we apply two different measures, namely the widely used index developed by Ginarte and Park (1997) and survey results presented by the WEF (2002) . In this way, we account for possible measurement problems. The Ginarte-Park index reveals the protection of patent rights in more than 100 countries, covering the period 1960-1995. 7 The index comprises five categories of national patent laws: extent ofcoverage, membership in international patent agreements, provisions for loss of protection, enforcement mechanisms, and duration of protection. The summary index ranges from zero to five, with higher values indicating stronger levels of protection.
World Economic Forum (WEF) data may help overcome some of the shortcomings of the Ginarte-Park index. First, this index refers to patent protection «on the books" only, 8 whereas it can reasonably be assumed that respondents of the WEF survey took enforcement problems into account when answering the question whether IPR protection is "weak or nonexistent" (score 1) or cCequal to the world's most stringent" (score 7).9 Second, the WEF survey is not restricted to patent protection, but relates to IPR protection in general. Third, this source provides for a more recent assessment and captures the effects of the TRIPS agreement on the level and variation of IPR protection. The additional information derived from WEF data comes at a cost, however. Survey results are available for only 75 countries, and not over time. Subjective survey data may be biased in that respondents may have different concepts in mind when answering one encompassing question about IPR protection, and they may not be able to assess the differences in IPR protection across countries. Moreover, survey data may be more prone to endogeneity problems than the Ginarte-Park index, as survey respondents may regard high FDI as an indication offavorable investment conditions, including strong IPR protection.
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The different strengths and weaknesses of alternative measures of IPR protection notwithstanding, both measures reveal a similar degree of variation across countries.11 Differences between the two indices are partly to be attributed to varying country coverage.
12 For some countries, however, deficiencies in actual enforcement of IPR protection on the books seem to account for particularly low scores in the survey by the WEF. 13
The empirical analysis is carried out in several steps. In the base run, we simply include the degree ofIPR protection into a gravity-type model ofthe determinants ofFDI and estimate left-censored tobit models. As dependent variable we use current FDI stockS. 14 The gravity model suggests to include the following more traditional FDI determinants as controls (expected sign in parentheses): per capita income ofthe host country (GDPPC: +); size of the host country, measured by population (POP: +); distance between the United States and the host country ofUS FDI in miles (DIST: -). In addition, we consider the sum of two institutional indicators (INST), namely control of corruption and regulatory quality (Kaufmann et al. 2002) , as a proxy of the cost of undertaking FDI in the respective host country.1S We expect the coefficient of INST to be positive, given that higher indicator values reveal better control of corruption and higher regulatory quality. Finally, we include the human capital endowment of host countries, proxied by average years of schooling (SCHOOL). The coefficient of SCHOOL should be positive as FDI frequently depends on the availability of complementary local factors of production. On the other hand, higher values of SCHOOL are supposed to reflect stronger local imitative capacity which tends to discourage FDI when IPR protection remains weak. Here and in the subsequent steps, the standard errors of the regression coefficients are corrected using White's (1980) heteroskedastic-consistent covariance matrix estimator.
We then turn to nonlinearities in the relationship between the degree of IPR protection and FDI. We start by analyzing how this relationship is shaped by host-country conditions. To this end, we interact IPR protection with GDPPC, POP, DIST, INST, and SCHOOL using multiplicative interaction terms. In order to assess the role of industry characteristics, manufacturing industries are classified according to five indicators-technology intensity, human capital intensity, labor intensity, export intensity, and the degree ofvertical integration. Against this backdrop, industry-specific esti-mations of the sensitivity of FDI to IPR protection are performed by modifying our base run so that not only the intercept but also the coefficient of the IPR protection index is allowed to differ across industries.
Finally, we address the issue of whether higher IPR protection helps attract not onlya higher quantity but also a higher quality ofFDI. We consider three quality-related dependent variables: the technology content ofFDI as captured by local R&D expenditure of US affiliates; the value added of US affiliates in the host country; and the exports of the US affiliates in the host country. The choice of these dependent variables is closely related to what host countries typically regard as higher-quality FDI. At least until the use of performance requirements was restrained or even prohibited through bilateral and multilateral agreements (notably, the TRIMS agreement), various host countries attempted to derive more benefits from FDI by imposing technology sharing requirements, local content requirements, and export performance requirements on foreign investors. 16 We regress each quality indicator on the IPR protection indices and predicted FDI stocks using a 2SLS approach.
4 Empirical Results
As noted before, the specification of the base run is fairly conventional. We regress current FDI stocks (in logs) on host countries' log per capita income (GDPPC), log population (POP), the distance between the United States and the host country (DIST), the cost of investing abroad (INST), and log average years ofschooling (SCHOOL). To capture the degree ofIPR protection, we add the Ginarte-Parkindex (GP) and, alternatively, the WEF index. All estimates also include a constant term and industry dummies that are not shown in the subsequent tables. The base-run results for GP refer to the year 1995, Le., the most recent year for which the Ginarte-Park index is available, whereas the results for WEF refer to 2000 as comparable WEF data are not available for earlier years ( Table 1) .
The control variables reveal the expected sign and are highly significant with few exceptions. In particular, the results support the conventional wisdom of gravity models that FDI is attracted by geographical proximity (DIST) as weH as by large markets (POP) and high per capita income (GDPPC) in the host countries. 18 At the same time, FDI stocks tend to be positively related to host countries' educational attainment (SCHOOL), whereas higher costs of investing abroad (INST) tend to discourage FDI.
IPR protection turns out to be insignificant in the base run. It cannot be ruled out that this result is due to coHinearity between IPR protection and GDPPC as weH as INST. Another interpretation is that the base run supports previous findings according to which nontraditional determinants ofFDI continue to playa marginal role (Nunnenkamp and Spatz 2002; Jost and Nunnenkamp 2003) .
Put differently, IPR protection may not provide additional explanatory power to market-and location-related driving forces ofFDI. Nevertheless, it may be surprising that IPR protection remains insignificant in all three specifications reported in Table 1. 19 Sampie selection does not appear to play an important role. The coefficient of GP is hardly affected when the Ginarte-Park index is considered for a reduced sampie, i.e., only for those countries for which WEF data are also available. In this way, mainly African countries are excluded, many ofwhich tend to be characterized by relatively strong IPR protection on the books whereas the enforcement ofIPRs may be deficient. Likewise, replacing GP by WEF has little effect, which is in conflict with the proposition that recent survey data provide a better indication of effective IPR protection. At the same time, the insignificance of both GP and WEF does not support the view that IPR protection has become more relevant in recent years.
Yet, a major qualification applies to the results reported in Table I , independently of whether IPR protection is measured by GP or WEF: The impact of IPR protection on FDI may be blurred as long as host-country characteristics and industry-specific factors are ignored. Host-country characteristics are expected to be relevant in that they reflect (a) host countries' alternative pull factors for FDI and (b) their capacity to imitate inventions and make unauthorized use of ownership advantages. At the same time, varying industry characteristics within the manufacturing sector are supposed to blur the impact of IPR protection as long as FDI is considered in aggregated terms. We refine our estimations in the following to explore these possibilities.
In order to identify differences related to host-country characteristics, we estimate the impact of the Ginarte-Park index and the WEF index on FDI stocks in the manufacturing sector by adding multiplicative interaction terms between GP and WEF, respectively, and host-country characteristics (Tables 2 and 3 ). The signs of the controlling variables are the same as in the base run in Table 1 . Moreover, the estimation results for IPR protection per se as well as its interaction with host-country characteristics underscore the base-run finding that, in contrast to what one might expect from the discussion of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two indicators in Section 3, it makes little difference whether IPR protection is measured by GPorWEF. Yet, the results reported in Tables 2 and 3 provide considerable support to the hypothesis that the impact of IPR protection on FDI depends on host-country characteristics. Nonlinearities emerge for four ofthe five hostcountry characteristics considered. Country size, measured by population (POP), represents the exception (specification 2). For both GP and WEF, the interaction term with POP turns out to be insignificant, which is in conflict with the proposition that foreign investors, generally, tend to disregard IPR protection in host countries where large domestic markets provide a strong stimulus to FDI. This suggests that the often-mentioned case of China is an exception in that foreign investors are eager to engage there even though they keep complaining about the lack of IPR protection. As concerns geographical proximity between the United States and the host countries ofFDI, the significantly positive coefficient ofthe interaction term in specification (3) reveals that IPR protection becomes a more important pull factor when host countries are located further away from the United States (and distance becomes a less important deterrent when IPR protection in the host country is strong). By differentiating specification (3) with respect to GP and DIST and setting the respective derivative equal to zero, one my calculate two thresholds indicating the strength of the interaction. On the one hand, for host-countries located less than 3,900 miles 20 from the United States, the total effect of an increase in the GP index is no longer positive. Hence, because of geographical proximity, IPR protection is not a relevant puH factor ofUS FDI for large parts ofthe Americas and the Caribbean. The minor importance ofGP for US FDI in this group ofhost countries mayaiso be due to the existence of preferential agreements on economic cooperation which the United States had concluded with neighboring countries. The NAFTA agreement with Canada and Mexico, but also free trade agreements with several Caribbean and Latin American partner countries increasingly included a comprehensive treatment of investment issues, substantive provisions against infringements of IPRs, and elaborate dispute settlement mechanisms. This means that US direct investors enjoy a higher degree of IPR protection than reflected in the indicators applied here. As a consequence, the substitution oflicensing for FDI becomes more likely in these host countries. On the other hand, more distant host countries need to achieve IPR protection in the order ofa Ginarte-Park index value of slightly above 4 in order to compensate for their locational disadvantage in attracting US FD!. This amounts to fairly strong IPR protection, recalling that the Ginarte-Park index ranges from 0 to 5.
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The negative interaction term between IPR protection and our proxy for the cost of investing abroad is not surprising. As noted earlier, INST reflects host-country conditions in terms of control of corruption and regulatory quality. In asense, this variable provides a more general assessment of institutional development achieved by the host countries of US FD!. Taking further into account that IPR protection is highly correlated with INST, foreign investors may take it for granted that IPR protection is sufficiently strong once the institutional development of host countries is rated fairly advanced (above an index value of 1.8 in the case of GP, with -5 and 5 representing the lower and upper limit, respectively, ofthe composite index of institutional development according to Kaufmann et al. 2002) . Below this threshold, however, host countries can attract US FDI by strengthening IPR protection, which may be less time-consuming than broader institutional reforms in order to control corruption and improve regulatory effieiency.
Finally, we find significant interaction terms with regard to GDPPC and SCHOOL. However, nonlinearities resulting from the negative interaction term between IPR protection and GDPPC are practieally irrelevant.
22 By contrast, nonlinearities turn out to be relevant when the endowment of human capital is regarded as a host-country characteristic. The estimates support the view that loeal availability ofhuman capital in combination with strong IPR protection may result in FDI being replaced by other means of making use of ownership advantages, with licensing representing the most likely candidate. If the Ginarte-Park index exeeeds the threshold of 4.7, which is close to the upper limit of this index, the effect ofschooling on FDI turns negative. However, no host country ofUS FDI has strengthened IPR protection beyond this point. If IPR protection is measured by WEF, the threshold is considerably lower (4.1, with the upper limit ofWEF being 7) and 32 host countries fulfill this condition. At the same time, the effect ofIPR protection on FDI depends on educational attainment in the host countries. The regression results suggest that both GP and WEF have a positive impact on US FDI for host countries with average years of schooling of up to about 7.5 years. Roughly two-thirds of all sampie countries are below this threshold. However, additional estimates we performed point to a humpshaped interaetion between GP and SCHOOL. We divided the sampie into three subgroups of equal size aecording to SCHOOL, and ran a modified left-censored regression which allows the intereept and the coefficient of GP to differ between the three subgroups. The results (not shown) support the hypothesis that host eountries' eapacity for loeal imitation plays a role in shaping the relationship between IPR protection and FDI. The coefficient ofGP is practically zero and insignificant for the subgroup with particularly low average years of schooling, Le., where the threat of local imitation is lowest. The threat ofloeal imitation increases with better local endowments ofhuman capital. It is eonsistent with this view that the coeffieient of GP is significantly positive for the intermediate schooling group. The coefficient ofGP turns eompletely insignifieant again for the subgroup with the highest educational attainment, where the replaeement ofFDI by licensing is most likely.
After having found evidence that host-country conditions have an important sayin the relationship between IPR protection and FDI, we nowturn to the role of industry characteristics. We focus on factors that are supposed to reflect the significance of ownership advantages and, thus, the benefits imitators may derive and, accordingly, the costs foreign direct investors may suffer from infringements of IPRs in the particular industry. In Table 4 , seven manufacturing industries for which the relevant data are available are classified according to five characteristics. The technology intensity as weH as the human capital intensity are shown to be relatively high in machinery and transport equipment. This points to strong ownership-specific advantages in these industries, which means that the potential benefits of host countries and the costs of foreign direct investors resulting from IPR infringements are high. The opposite case applies to the food and metals industries, for which the technology intensity is clearly below the average for total manufacturing and the human capital intensity is moderate at best.
The regression results reported in Table 5 for the interaction of GP and WEF with dummies for specific manufacturing industries clearly reflect these differences in industry characteristics. Taking into account that the industry classification differs slightly between the years 1995 and 2000, the industry-specific coefficients of GP and WEF reveal a high degree of conformity. For both measures of IPR protection, we find the strongest impact of IPR protection on FDI stocks in transport equipment. GP has a similarly strong impact in machinery; the positive coefficient of WEF remains insignificant in this industry, possibly because data constraints prevent us from disaggregating electrical equipment from other machinery 409 in the estimate for 2000. The estimate for 1995 shows that IPR protection had also a positive, but somewhat weaker impact on FDI stocks in electrical equipment. By contrast, the coefficients ofboth GP and WEF are negative, though insignificant with one exception, in other industries. Electrical equipment and the chemical industry deserve closer inspection. Ownership-specific advantages in electrical equipment are moderate when technology intensity is considered, and still weaker according to human capital intensity. Nonetheless, US direct investors appear to be concerned about insufficient IPR protection in this industry. This is, possibly, because electrical equipment stands out in two respects: The operations of US affiliates in the host countries are extremely employment-intensive, and US affiliates are closely integrated in production sharing with their parent companies via intrafirm trade.
23 While the latter characteristic may reveal insights into the global operations ofUS parents, the first characteristic may add to the threat of local imitation through dissemination of knowledge acquired by the employees working in US affiliates abroad.
Foreign employment and vertical integration mayaiso help explain why IPR protection does not appear to have affected FDI stocks in the chemical industry. In both regards, chemicals represent the opposite extreme to electrical equipment. Stand-alone operations of foreign subsidiaries of US chemical producers and the relatively small number of workers employed in the host countries seem to have diminished the threat that ownershipspecific advantages could be copied easily. However, there may be another reason why we have to reject the hypothesis advanced by Maskus (2000: 4) , who considers IPR protection to be highly relevant for foreign direct investors in the chemical industry, and, rather, support empirical findings by Primo Braga and Fink (2000) . US FDI stocks in the chemical industry are strongly concentrated in industrialized host countries.
24 Taking into account that IPR protection is stronger in industrialized countries than in developing countries, a substitution of licensing for FDI seems more likely in chemicals than in other manufacturing industries. In the final step of our analysis, we consider three quality indicators of FDI as dependent variables. 25 As noted in Section 3, policymakers typically perceive FDI to deliver higher benefits to host countries if foreign direct investors apply advanced technologies, as evidenced by local R&D expenditure, create value added, and increase exports. Table 6 reports the results of a 2SLS left-censored regression of GP and WEF, respectively, on these indicators, controlling for FDI stocks predicted on the basis ofspecifications (1) and (3) in Table 1 . In other wor,ds, the question is whether, given a certain FDI stock, host countries with strong IPR protection receive higher benefits from FDI than host countries with weak IPR protection.
The results suggest that host countries cannot only attract more FDI but mayaiso derive more benefits from FDI by strengthening IPR protection. Yet, policymakers seeking to attract high-quality FDI may be well advised not to read too much into the results ofTable 5. Several qualifications have to be taken into account. The effects of both measures of IPR protection on R&D expenditure of US affiliates appear to be particularly strong. It cannot be ruled out, however, that this is due to omitted variable problems, Le., R&D expenses and IPR protection being driven by a third factor; both variables tend to increase with higher economic development ofhost countries. Omitted variable problems are less obvious in the case of exports. But the significantly positive coefficient ofWEF may result from WEF capturing host-country characteristics that are more important in shaping the export orientation of US affiliates. For instance, open host countries, in terms of foreign trade policies, tend to protect IPRs more strongly than relatively closed host countries.26 Finally, the positive effect of IPR protection on the value added of US affiliates in the host countries remains insignificant.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper aims at overcoming several shortcomings of previous empirical studies on the relationship between IPR protection and FDI. First of all, FDI is analyzed on a disaggregated level since the threat of an unauthorized use of intellectual-property-related assets is expected to depend on industry as well as host-country characteristics. Second, we address the proposition that stronger IPR protection raises not only the quantity of FDI but also the quality ofFDI in terms of its technology content as well as the value added and exports created by FDI. Third, we check to which extent the relationship between IPR protection and FDI is affected by applying alternative measures of IPR protection.
The measurement of IPR protection proved to be less relevant than expected. The results achieved on the basis of the survey presented by the WEF (2002) reveal strong similarities to results for the widely used index developed by Ginarte and Park (1997) . By contrast, the empirical findings underscore the need to consider FDI in disaggregated terms. Both, host-country characteristics and industry characteristics have an important say in the relationship between IPR protection and FDI stocks held by US companies in the manufacturing sector of developing and developed host countries. Host-country characteristics matter in that IPR protection has weaker effects in countries with dominating pull factors for FDI, notably proximity to the United States. We also find some evidence that FDI is sig-nificantly increased by stronger IPR protection only where local imitative capacity, proxied by schooling, can be regarded as moderate. The effects remain insignificant for countries with insufficient local capacity for imitation as weIl as for advanced countries, in which particularly strong IPR protection may induce a substitution oflicensing for FDI.
Industry characteristics reflect the significance of ownership-specific advantages which, in turn, reveal the benefits host countries can derive and the costs foreign direct investors suffer from infringements of IPRs. It fits into this reasoning that the impact of IPR protection turns out to be strongest in the human-capital-and technology-intensive machinery and transport equipment industries. By contrast, IPR protection does not play an important role in the food and metals industries, which are characterized bya particularly low technology intensity. In the chemical industry, standalone operations ofUS affiliates and the relatively small number ofworkers they employed in the host countries tend to have diminished the threat that ownership-specific advantages could be copied easily.
FinaIly, we find that host countries cannot only attract more FDI but mayaiso derive more benefits from FDI by strengthening IPR protection. Especially R&D expenditure by US affiliates tends to rise with stronger IPR protection. Yet, policymakers, who are increasingly eager to lure foreign direct investors, should not expect too much from strengthening IPR protection as a stimulus to more and higher-quality FD1. For various developing countries, the effects on the quantity ofFDI are likely to be dominated by pull factors related to the host country's market and location. In advanced host countries with strong IPR protection, FDI may increasingly be replaced by licensing. Quality aspects ofFDI, though positively correlated with stronger IPR protection, are likely to be driven in the first place by factors that could not be captured in the present analysis. The export orientation of FDI is a case in point: The openness of host countries, in terms of their trade policy, may be more important than IPR protection in stimulating FDI-related exports.
Policymakers should also be aware that sufficient IPR protection may be taken for granted by foreign direct investors in the future. The trend toward a harmonization of IPR protection will probably continue due to unilateral measures and the implementation of multilateral obligations. As a consequence, host countries would no longer be able to distinguish themselves from other competitors for FDI by strengthening IPR protection. Similar to the liberalization ofother regulatory and administrative measures of host countries with regard to the activities of foreign direct investors, the expected convergence of national IPR regimes will have as an effect that adequate IPR protection is a necessary condition für FDI, at least for host countries lacking other strong pull factors, while strengthening IPR protection suffers from diminishing returns in inducing more and better FDI.
